Teaching on Emptiness: Introduction to Middle Way (Madhyamaka) - Prasangika and Svatantrika Schools
空性見教授—應成自續兩派中觀見簡介

Kyabje Gosok Rinpoche
Teaching on Emptiness: Introduction to Middle Way (Madhyamaka) – Prasangika  and Svatantrika Schools

Dec 3, 2016 at TaiChung.

Eradicating Self-Grasping

As stated in The Three Principal Aspects of the Path:

“Even if one cultivates renunciation and bodhicitta, one cannot uproot the root of existence.”

Merely cultivating renunciation and bodhicitta is insufficient to eradicate the root of cyclic existence — self-grasping ignorance — and thus cannot lead to the ultimate bliss of perfect peace, the state of non-abiding nirvana and omniscience.

Therefore, to attain ultimate happiness, we must accomplish its cause, which is the complete eradication of the root of suffering — self-grasping ignorance. This is our most critical task. Hence, the antidote to fundamental self-grasping — the profound wisdom that realizes the truth of selflessness — is of utmost importance.

Realizing Emptiness

If we follow the stages of learning process, the first step is cultivating renunciation, followed by bodhicitta, and then using the nine methods of stabilizing the mind to achieve shamatha (calm abiding). Once shamatha is achieved, we should not rely on worldly forms of meditative quiescence, because what we seek primarily is liberation and the state of omniscience. Therefore, we must strive to eliminate self-grasping ignorance. To this end, we should diligently practice the methods for developing supramundane vipassana (special insight).

As stated in “Praise of the Worthy Praise”:

“Even without perfect concentration, one can still cut through the bonds of samsara while under the watchful eyes of demons.”

This means we need to diligently realize the profound meaning of emptiness. Without realizing emptiness, one cannot attain liberation. Thus, we should not be content merely with having relative bodhicitta but should practice both skillful means and wisdom together.

Just as a bird needs two wings to soar into the sky, we need both conventional bodhicitta and the profound wisdom of emptiness to practice the sublime path. Gradually, we can eradicate the root of afflictions — ignorance and the habit of clinging to inherent existence — and thereby attain the state of supreme enlightenment.

As Je Tsongkhapa said:

“Without the wisdom that realizes the truth, even if one practices renunciation and bodhicitta, one cannot uproot the source of existence. Therefore, one should diligently cultivate the understanding of dependent origination.”

The Benefits of Generating Reasonable Doubt

Regarding emptiness, even before fully realizing it, merely generating a reasonable doubt about it can weaken self-grasping, just as a garment becomes torn; or as hail destroys crops, it can impair the functioning of self-grasping. For example, consider an inflated pillow. If you puncture it with a needle, the air inside gradually escapes, and its function is destroyed. Once its function is gone, the remaining air dissipates.

Similarly, merely generating a reasonable doubt can accumulate immeasurable merit.

The Importance of the Pure View

A few days ago, they requested permission to receive certain jenang initiations. I think it is unnecessary to transmit many. Granting one is sufficient. However, spending a day explaining the pure view of emptiness might bring greater benefit.

Even a reasonable doubt about emptiness brings great benefit. Therefore, I hope we can establish some familiarity with the correct view of emptiness.

To fully realize emptiness, we need the support of merit. We must correctly understand the Buddha’s teachings, the definitive meaning, and the intent of the Victorious Ones without distortion. For this reason, it is crucial to receive teachings from a qualified teacher who clearly explains the meaning of emptiness.

On this basis, we should listen to the teachings, individually practice accumulating merit and purifying obscurations, pray to our guru and yidam as inseparable. Repeatedly study and contemplate the scriptures.

When these are combined, we can gradually familiarize ourselves with emptiness and eventually realize it.

Profound Compassion of Shakyamuni

Master Shakyamuni Buddha, with his profound compassion and wisdom, taught according to the capacities and inclinations of sentient beings, gradually guiding them toward the ultimate pure view of emptiness:

• Vaibhashika view
• Sautrantika view
• the Yogacara view
• Madhyamaka view.

In this way, with great skillful means, he gradually introduced these views in sequence. The most supreme and ultimate view is the Madhyamaka view, and within it, the Prasangika-Madhyamaka view is considered the most profound. The Prasangika-Madhyamaka asserts: “Emptiness is the meaning of dependent origination, and dependent origination is the meaning of emptiness.” This profound teaching that elucidates such a principle is the essence of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka view.

Gradual Guidance to Realize the Correct View

To guide sentient beings step by step into the correct view,

• the Buddha first taught the absence of inherent existence to eliminate the grasping at a truly existent self (the view of an independent, inherently existent person).
• Next, for those with sharp faculties and intelligence, he analyzed whether phenomena have true existence.
• Then, for those with even greater wisdom, he explained that although phenomena lack true existence, they conventionally exist.
• Finally, for those with the highest discernment, he revealed the ultimate view — that all phenomena are devoid of inherent nature.

These teachings demonstrate how the Bhagavan gradually guided sentient beings to realize the supreme and ultimate view: “Emptiness is the meaning of dependent origination, and dependent origination is the meaning of emptiness,” according to the capacities and inclinations of sentient beings.

Following the Founders of the Philosophical Schools

To determine such a correct view, one must follow one of the founders of the philosophical schools. These founders are bodhisattva sages who were personally prophesied by the Buddha in numerous sutras and tantras and who can skillfully explain the scriptures. We should follow such sages.

Nagarjuna

The Bhagavan Buddha once said:

“In the southern country of Vidarbha, there will be a noble monk named ‘Nagarjuna,’ who will refute the extremes of existence and non-existence.”

Nagarjuna, the prophesied holy master, is unparalleled in explaining the Buddha’s ultimate intent, which transcends both extremes of existence and non-existence or permanence and nihilism. We must follow such a correct view. It is unacceptable to invent new interpretations based on one’s own assumptions without following this lineage. As Arya Chandrakirti stated:

“To depart from the path of Nagarjuna is to lose the true means of liberation; abandoning conventional truth and ultimate truth, one cannot attain liberation.”

To achieve the state of liberation, the non-abiding nirvana, one must realize the profound emptiness. If one does not follow Nagarjuna but seeks other interpretations, one cannot attain the correct view.

The Buddha prophesied about the holy master Nagarjuna: “Four hundred years after my parinirvana, he will appear.” True to this prophecy, Nagarjuna was born around the 1st century CE, four hundred years after the Buddha’s passing. He had many disciples, categorized as “early disciples,” “middle disciples,” and “later disciples,” suggesting he lived for at least three hundred years. This can be inferred from the timeline of his disciples.

His primary disciple was Aryadeva, who was among his later disciples and may have been a prince of Sri Lanka (“Sinhala”). In his later years, Nagarjuna traveled to southern India, where he established many monasteries. It was during this time that Aryadeva met Nagarjuna and became his foremost disciple.

Later, Aryadeva went to Nalanda Monastery, where he served as abbot for a long time before traveling to southern India again to build more temples. Aryadeva, (Holy Deva) is regarded as the representative of Nagarjuna in all respects.

For the Svatantrika and Prasangika Madhyamaka schools, their two primary teachers are Nagarjuna and Aryadeva, collectively known as the “Holy Father and Son.”

Atisha and Tsongkhapa’s Adherence to the Correct View

As the incomparable Atisha said:

“Who can realize emptiness? The Tathagata predicted Nagarjuna, who realized the truth of reality, and his disciple Chandrakirti. By relying on their transmitted teachings, one can realize the truth of reality.”

One must rely on the teachings transmitted by the holy master Nagarjuna and his foremost disciple Chandrakirti to explain the ultimate intent of the Buddha — the Madhyamaka view.

It is said that Je Tsongkhapa, the holy master Manjushri, once intended to personally travel to India to meet Nagarjuna and Maitripa, seeking the ultimate intent of the Buddhas — the profound Madhyamaka view. At that time, the great adept of Lhodrak dissuaded him, saying: “Do not go! Staying here will bring greater benefit than going to India. If you go there, although you may become the abbot of the Vajrasana, you will face significant obstacles later.”

Moreover, Manjushri himself appeared to Tsongkhapa. Later, Tsongkhapa relied on Manjushri, praying to him for realization of the profound Madhyamaka view. Ultimately, through studying Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way and chapters sixteen and eighteen of Buddhapalita’s Commentary , he attained and fully understood the error-free profound Madhyamaka view — the ultimate intent of Nagarjuna.

The Middle Way School

The term “Middle Way School” (Madhyamaka) refers to the view that avoids the extremes of eternalism and nihilism, abiding in the middle. Because it upholds this correct view, it is called the “Middle Way School.”

The two extremes — eternalism and nihilism — are also referred to as the “existent extreme” and the “non-existent extreme,” or simply the extremes of existence and non-existence.

Why are these called the “existent extreme” and the “non-existent extreme”? Every phenomenon has its mode of existence. If one claims that there is an existence beyond the boundaries of what truly exists, this is called the “existent extreme.” Similarly, if one asserts a non-existence that goes beyond the limits of what does not exist, this is called the “non-existent extreme.”

The correct view of the Middle Way opposes both of these extremes and abides in the middle, hence the name “Middle Way School.” To elaborate: exceeding the measure of “existence” and claiming something greater than it leads to falling into the “existent extreme.” Likewise, exceeding the measure of “non-existence” and claiming something more absolute in its negation leads to falling into the “non-existent extreme.”

These two extremes correspond to eternalism and nihilism, where falling into the “existent extreme” is the same as falling into eternalism, and falling into the “non-existent extreme” is the same as falling into nihilism.

Definitions of the “Eternalist Extreme” and the “Nihilist Extreme”

The “eternalist extreme” is also called the “exaggeration extreme.” The “nihilist extreme” is also known as the “diminution extreme.”

“Exaggeration” refers to taking something that does not exist and falsely asserting that it does, exaggerating its nature and going beyond its actual boundaries. This is why it is called the “exaggeration extreme.” For example, claiming that something nonexistent actually exists due to artificial fabrication is an instance of the “exaggeration extreme.”

On the other hand, the “nihilist extreme” is also called the “diminution extreme.” “Diminution” means denying the existence of things that do exist, such as denying the reality of karma, cause and effect, the Three Jewels, and so forth. This denial of what truly exists is called the “diminution extreme.”

In summary, the two extremes of eternalism and nihilism are also referred to as the “exaggeration extreme” and the “diminution extreme.”

Falling into the Two Extremes

What does it mean when we say “falling into the two extremes,” such as falling into the eternalist or nihilist extremes, or the extremes of existence and non-existence?

Here’s an analogy: the edge of a cliff is called the “boundary.” Once you cross this boundary, you fall off the cliff. There are two ways to fall: falling forward or falling backward. The edge of the cliff is like the “boundary.”

Let us first discuss “falling into the eternalist extreme.” The “eternalist extreme” refers to clinging to things as truly existent or inherently existent. For example, when explaining the Middle Way School, it is often said that clinging to inherent existence is the eternalist extreme.

However, this does not mean that anyone who clings to inherent existence has already fallen into the eternalist extreme. This is because the mind that clings to inherent existence is present in all bodhisattvas, Mahayana sages, Prasangika-Madhyamaka practitioners, and indeed all proponents of the Middle Way School.

So how do we define “falling into the eternalist extreme”? If one is bound by clinging to inherent existence, they are said to have “fallen into the eternalist extreme.” What does “being bound by clinging to inherent existence” mean? If a person investigates whether phenomena are truly existent or not truly existent but remains unable to transcend this clinging, then they are considered “bound by clinging to inherent existence.”

In other words, once one is bound by clinging to inherent existence, they have fallen into the eternalist extreme. If someone merely investigates whether phenomena are inherently existent but lacks the ability to transcend this clinging, they remain entangled in it and are thus said to have “fallen into the eternalist extreme.”

Similarly, for the “non-existent extreme,” it is not the case that denying the existence of any phenomenon automatically constitutes “falling into the nihilist extreme.” Rather, “falling into the nihilist extreme” refers to denying the existence of the Three Jewels, karma and its effects, and the Four Noble Truths, thereby rejecting these evident truths. Such denial is what is meant by “falling into the nihilist extreme.” Those who deny subtler truths, however, are not necessarily considered to have “fallen into the nihilist extreme.”

Svatantrika-Madhyamaka School

Those who avoid the extremes of eternalism and nihilism and abide in the middle way are called Madhyamaka. Madhyamaka is divided into two schools:

• Svatantrika-Madhyamaka
• Prasangika-Madhyamaka.

Let us first discuss the Svatantrika-Madhyamaka. Buddhapalita, a disciple of the holy master Nagarjuna, wrote “The Commentary on the Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way by Buddhapalita”. Later, Bhaviveka criticized his views and advocated for an interpretation based on Svatantrika.

In response, Chandrakirti, a disciple of Buddhapalita, said: “Though you criticize Buddhapalita, you yourself have faults.” He then refuted these faults and defended Buddhapalita.

Bhaviveka interpreted Nagarjuna’s intent using autonomous reasoning and founded the Svatantrika-Madhyamaka school, including its sub-school, the Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamaka.

Bhaviveka authored “The Heart of Madhyamaka”, (Madhyamakahrdayakarika), and its commentary, “The Blaze of Reasoning”, (Tarkajvala), which refuted Buddhapalita’s views and established the doctrinal framework of the Svatantrika-Madhyamaka school. In these works, he also described and refuted many non-Buddhist views.

As a result, the great protector Atisha frequently taught “The Blaze of Reasoning” after arriving in Tibet.

What does the term “Svatantrika-Madhyamaka” mean? Regarding the valid cognitions of both the proponent (the one presenting the thesis) and the opponent (the one challenging the thesis), they assert that a valid cognition arises with respect to phenomena that are established from their own side. Those who advocate this view are called “Svatantrika.”

They claim that (Rinpoche reiterated this point) the Unimpaired cognitions of both the proponent and the opponent give rise to inferential valid cognitions regarding the agreed-upon subject of debate. Therefore, they are called “Svatantrika.”

It may be difficult to fully grasp this concept without prior studies of

• Buddhist logic reasoning (Hetuvidya),
• Mind and mental phenomena (Cittavidya), and
• Categories and Classification

The terms “proponent” and “opponent” refer to the following: The “proponent” is the one who first presents the meaning or view of the scriptures. After the proponent makes their statement, others challenge or debate them, and these challengers are called the “opponents.” This is what is meant by the “proponent and opponent.”

Regarding the previously mentioned “Unimpaired valid cognition,” let us briefly explain. It refers to a cognition that is not deceptive with respect to the appearing object or the conceived object when establishing phenomena. If one has not studied the Categories and Classifications of mind, it may be difficult to understand the terms “appearing object” and “conceived object.”

Position and Characteristics of the Svatantrika School

We are discussing the Svatantrika school, which asserts that things have inherent characteristics. Therefore, “non-mistaken valid cognition” refers to a mind that is not mistaken about the inherent characteristics of its appearing object and the object of engagement.

The Svatantrika school maintains that both the proponent and opponent agree on a commonly accepted subject (the basis of the thesis) – if it is a valid reason, then there is a subject (the basis of the thesis) – and that valid cognition arises with respect to this thesis. This is the position of the Svatantrika school.

The Prasangika school does not accept this view; this is the unique assertion of the Svatantrika school. It is not easy for us to immediately understand or grasp the Svatantrika school.

The term “Svatantrika” is not straightforward to comprehend and requires understanding the object of refutation and its key points. If one understands the Prasangika school, it will be somewhat helpful in understanding the Svatantrika school.

A Comparison of Different Cognitive Approaches

The various viewpoints often discussed refer to the fact that we each have our own ways of cognizing internal and external phenomena, depending on how we think and perceive.

For example: Is something beautiful or ugly? Is the mind virtuous or non-virtuous? Is someone good or bad?

Thus, from the perspective of modes of cognition, there are different approaches:

• the Vaibhashika approach,
• the Sautrantika approach,
• the Yogacara approach,
• the scientific approach.

All these cognitive methods examine the nature of external objects and the mind’s essence, and according to their respective levels of thought, they produce corresponding understandings. Then there is the Madhyamaka approach to cognition.

These cognitive methods are all based on philosophical views. Among them, the most profound and ultimate is the Madhyamaka approach to cognition.

Svatantrika View of Emptiness and Their Criterion for Inherent Existence

So, how does the Svatantrika-Madhyamaka school perceive emptiness? How do they understand its contradictory counterpart, “inherent existence”? In general, how do proponents of emptiness’s contradictory counterpart define emptiness?

Answer: There is a standard for establishing inherent existence.

If asked: Given this, what is the standard for establishing the contradictory counterpart of emptiness — inherent existence?

Answer: It is not established through the Unimpaired Mind but rather exists inherently within the nature of the object itself. In other words, they argue that if something exists not through the Unimpaired Mind’s imputation but through its intrinsic nature, it is “inherently existent.”

Such “existence,” if it were to exist, would be “inherently existent”; if it absolutely does not exist, it is not “inherently existent.” Therefore, if something is not established through the Unimpaired Mind’s imputation but is examined solely from the perspective of the object itself, and nothing is found, this is “emptiness.”

The above is the Svatantrika view. Without first explaining the Svatantrika view, it would be difficult to introduce the Prasangika view, so we have spent some time elucidating their position.

Svatantrika Analysis of “Unimpaired Mind” and “External Object’s Nature”

So, how is the “Unimpaired Mind” established in the context of “establishment by Unimpaired appearance”?

It is established through the intentionality (mental engagement) of such a mind. A “Unimpaired Mind” refers to both sense perception and conceptual thought — it is a mind that does not err or misapprehend its objects.

If something were to exist independently of being established by this Unimpaired Mind, existing solely from the side of the external object itself, such a claim would be untenable.

However, this does not mean that the existence of phenomena is established by a mind that has not yet ascertained them.

Rather, it means that phenomena are established by the Unimpaired Mind in relation to the nature of the external object itself. These two aspects — dependence on the mind and the nature of the object — are not contradictory.

Without depending on establishment by a Unimpaired Mind, existence solely from the side of the external object’s nature is impossible. Instead, existence is established by the Unimpaired Mind in relation to the object’s own nature.

Analogy of Magical Objects Appearing as Elephants and Horses

For example: Without depending on the mental imputation of someone whose eyes have been deceived by spells or drugs, it is impossible for wood and stones to appear as elephants and horses.

However, when the mind of someone whose eyes have been deceived by spells or drugs imputes this appearance, it is possible for wood and stones to appear as elephants and horses.

This means that if the appearance is mentally imputed, then from the side of the illusory object itself, there is a nature that allows it to appear as elephants and horses, just as in the analogy given earlier.

For instance, if someone whose eyes have been deceived by spells or drugs does not depend on their mind’s imputation, wood and stones will not appear as elephants and horses.

The reason these objects appear as elephants and horses is because their eyes have been deceived. If their eyes had not been deceived, elephants and horses would not appear.

Due to the mental imputation of someone whose eyes have been deceived by spells or drugs, wood and stones can appear as elephants and horses. That is to say, they can appear as elephants and horses to that person.

Moreover, from the perspective of the illusory object itself, there is also a nature that allows it to appear as elephants and horses. Thus, these two aspects — the mental imputation and the nature of the object — are not contradictory.

Regarding the magical objects that appear due to the mind’s influence, they can also manifest as elephants and horses, correct? There is no contradiction between these two points.

For wood and stones to appear as elephants and horses, if it were not for the minds of those whose eyes have been deceived by spells or drugs, the magical objects of wood and stone could not appear as elephants and horses.

However, from the perspective of the mind’s imputation, there exists the potential for these magical objects to manifest as elephants and horses.

These two points are not contradictory; they align with what was just explained and refer to the same analogy.

If it were not for the imputation of the mind of a person whose eyes have been deceived by spells or drugs, then from the side of the magical objects themselves, they would not be able to appear as elephants and horses.

Their appearance cannot exist independently of the mind’s imputation. This analogy explains: The magician transforms the magical objects of wood and stone into elephants and horses, and then the audience’s eyes are deceived.

Because the audience’s eyes are deceived, the wooden and stony magical objects appear as elephants and horses.

If it were not for the imputation of the minds of individuals whose eyes have been deceived by spells or drugs, the magical objects of wood and stone would not appear as elephants and horses.

What Do Sentient Beings Who Have Not Realized Emptiness Grasp At?

Sentient beings who have not realized emptiness grasp at the following: No matter how phenomena appear or how objects arise, they believe these things exist independently of being mentally imputed — existing inherently from the side of the external object itself. This gives rise to the grasping at true existence. This type of grasping is called “grasping at inherent existence.”

As in the previous analogy, consider how the audience whose eyes have been deceived by spells or drugs perceive wood and stones as elephants and horses. They do not realize that this appearance is established by their own minds’ imputation or conceptual designation. Instead, they grasp that real elephants and horses existed there from the very beginning.

Similarly, we sentient beings who have not realized emptiness perceive phenomena and unconsciously assume that they exist inherently from the side of the external object, rather than being mentally imputed. This is what is meant by “grasping at inherent existence.”

In summary, the Svatantrika-Madhyamaka school advocates “inherent existence in terms of its own character.” To assert “inherent existence in terms of its own character,” two aspects are required: existence from the side of the object itself and establishment through the mind’s imputation. Both are necessary. Establishment by the Unimpaired Mind and existence from the side of the object itself must be combined.

Svatantrika View on “Establishment by Unimpaired Mind”

The Svatantrika view on “establishment by Unimpaired Mind” can be explained as follows: Our minds, whether conceptual or non-conceptual, depend on multiple components to produce a composite cognition. Whenever any phenomenon arises in this mind, it is established through these components and imputed by that mind.

However, the phenomena thus established are not purely imputed by the mind; they appear to exist inherently from the side of the object. Therefore, the object being imputed must be findable upon analysis. If it cannot be found, such an establishment would not be valid.

In short, when phenomena appear to the mind, they are perceived as existing from their own side. The way the object appears determines its nature (mode of existence).

When a composite cognition arises depending on multiple components, this cognition is understood as arising from the side of the object itself.

This composite cognition corresponds to how the object appears, thereby defining its nature.

Furthermore, this nature is also mentally imputed — meaning it is established by the Unimpaired Mind. Both aspects — the object’s appearance and mental imputation — are necessary for this establishment.

In summary, “establishment by mental appearance” means that whatever is grasped by the mind becomes the nature of the external object, hence the term “establishment by mental appearance.”

That is to say, whatever is grasped by the non-mistaken mind becomes the nature of the external object, referred to as “establishment by mental appearance.”

As for “mere imputation by conceptual thought,” does the Svatantrika school accept “mere imputation by conceptual thought”? Some say yes, others say no; we believe they do not accept it.

Then, do they accept “establishment by conceptual appearance”? In general, is it established by the Unimpaired Mind?

Regarding “establishment by mental appearance,” there are two types of mind here: sense perception and conceptual thought, correct?

Question: Is it “establishment by conceptual appearance”? It is established by mental appearance.

Then, is it “establishment by conceptual appearance”? Is it “mere establishment by conceptual appearance”? Is it “mere establishment by appearance”?

There is much to contemplate regarding “mere establishment by conceptual appearance.” So, is it “mere establishment by mental appearance”? Here, the word “mere” negates existence from the side of the object’s unique nature.

Since this has been negated, they affirm “mere establishment by mental appearance.”

Since they affirm “mere establishment by mental appearance,” they also affirm “mere establishment by conceptual appearance.” This is somewhat challenging, isn’t it? Many people accept “mere establishment by conceptual appearance.”

“A Commentary on the Hidden and Profound Intent of the Introduction to the Middle Way” states:

“Thus, although there is no nature established without dependence on mental appearance, it is not contradictory to affirm a nature that is not mere imputation but is established through such dependence. Therefore, the objects of refutation for the two Madhyamaka schools differ greatly in terms of establishment by the mind.”

This means that while there is no nature established independently of mental appearance, it is acceptable to affirm a nature that is not merely imputed but is established through such dependence.

These two views do not contradict each other. Thus, the objects of refutation for the two Madhyamaka schools differ significantly in how they explain establishment by the mind. In other words, the two schools interpret the subtleties differently.

If one accepts this interpretation, we have similar views; if not, then the phrase “mere imputation by that dependence” is interpreted differently based on the negation implied by the word “mere.” This is how the meaning is explained.

As the Prasangika school affirms, there is a nature that is not merely imputed, and this does not contradict their reasoning. Some classify these further into distinctions such as: all phenomena are established solely through conceptual dependence, solely through mental dependence, or solely through conceptual imputation.

All of these have their own interpretations, supported by authoritative scriptures and teachings of the lineage masters.

The above explanation refers to “mere establishment by mental appearance.”

“A Commentary on the Hidden and Profound Intent of the Introduction to the Middle Way” further states:

“Although there is no nature established without dependence on mental appearance, it is not contradictory to affirm a nature that is not mere imputation but is established through such dependence.”

The meaning of this requires careful reflection. It also states:

“Therefore, the objects of refutation for the two Madhyamaka schools differ greatly in terms of establishment by the mind.”

This means that the objects of refutation for the Svatantrika and Prasangika schools differ significantly in depth and scope, with major differences in how they explain establishment by the mind.

The Svatantrika-Madhyamaka school is divided into two:

• Sautrantika-Svatantrika founded by Bhaviveka
• Yogacara-Svatantrika founded by Santaraksita

The term “established through the intentionality of sentient beings” refers to two types of intentionality: conceptual and non-conceptual.

It also states: “Causing them to see what is shown”, “Causing them to see” refers only to conceptual thought, not non-conceptual perception.

Thus, Jnanagarbha states: “The object of refutation — true existence — is not seen by non-conceptual sense perception.”

This statement, “not seen by non-conceptual sense perception,” aligns with the view of Santaraksita and his lineage: “The object of refutation — true existence — is not seen by sense perception.” Additionally, there is the concept of “self-established nature,” which does not require further explanation.

The above discussion pertains to the Svatantrika-Madhyamaka school.

The Prasangika-Madhyamaka School

The Prasangika view was initiated by Buddhapalita and later expounded by Chandrakirti. Buddhapalita is considered the founder of the Prasangika school, while Chandrakirti primarily systematized its doctrines, stating: “Autonomous reasoning is invalid; consequential reasoning is valid.” The actual founder of the Prasangika school is Buddhapalita, though there are differing accounts in the texts.

What is the Prasangika-Madhyamaka school? This school asserts that it is unnecessary to rely on a mutually agreed-upon subject of debate (the basis of discussion) between the proponent and opponent — unlike the Svatantrika school, which does require this. Instead, it suffices to rely solely on the opponent’s own assertions, using their premises to establish inferential cognition of the thesis. For this reason, it is called the “Prasangika-Madhyamaka school.”

As previously explained, the Prasangika school holds that the notion of a “mutually agreed-upon basis of debate” is entirely unnecessary. Asserting such a basis is meaningless. Instead, one only needs to rely on the opponent’s own reasoning and propose a consequence based on their premises.

During debates between proponents and opponents, there is no need for autonomous reasoning; relying solely on the opponent’s premises suffices. Why is autonomous reasoning unnecessary? As just explained, the Prasangika school argues that autonomous reasoning is not required. One simply identifies the premises asserted by the opponent and proposes consequences based on them. Those who employ this method of presenting consequences are called the “Prasangika-Madhyamaka school.”

For example: If someone asserts “sound is permanent,” we would say: If you assert that “sound is permanent,” it is illogical because sound is impermanent. Why is it impermanent? Because it is produced by causes and conditions.

In this way, although the parties may have different views, when the opponent asserts that “sound is permanent,” you do not need to immediately prove that “sound is impermanent.” Instead, you follow the opponent’s assertion: If they claim that “sound is permanent,” you can counter as follows: “If you assert that sound is permanent, you must also accept that sound is not momentary in nature; if you accept that sound is not momentary, it follows that sound is not produced by causes and conditions, because permanence excludes causation.”

As long as the opponent’s position contains flaws, you can challenge them in this way without needing to present an autonomous argument based on mutual agreement.

In summary, what is the Prasangika-Madhyamaka school? It asserts that there is no need to rely on a mutually agreed-upon basis of debate between the proponent and opponent. Instead, by relying solely on the opponent’s assertions, one can generate inferential cognition of the thesis. Those who hold this view are called the “Prasangika school.”

To further summarize, the term “Prasangika” means that there is no need for autonomous reasoning or autonomous premises; rather, one only needs to establish a consequence (“such-and-such is flawed”) based on the opponent’s premises to generate inferential cognition.

In other words, there is no need to rely on autonomous premises; relying solely on establishing a consequence suffices to generate inferential cognition. Therefore, it is called the “Prasangika-Madhyamaka school.” In essence, this is its meaning. While some texts may express this slightly differently, the overall idea is similar.

There is no need to elaborate further. The differences between these views arise from different ways of understanding phenomena.

How does the Prasangika-Madhyamaka school uniquely understand the ultimate nature of phenomena? Its view is much deeper than that of the Svatantrika-Madhyamaka school.

The two schools differ greatly in the depth and subtlety of their respective views. The Prasangika-Madhyamaka school asserts that nothing exists independently of mere conceptual imputation; nothing exists inherently from the side of the object itself.

The Svatantrika-Madhyamaka school, on the other hand, asserts that nothing exists independently of being established by a Unimpaired Mind; nothing exists inherently from the side of the external object itself. Though the wording may appear similar, the meanings differ.

Let us use an analogy to distinguish between them. In the phrase “mere conceptual imputation,” the word “mere” negates existence from the side of the object’s inherent nature.

Thus, the Prasangika school asserts that nothing exists inherently from the side of the external object beyond mere conceptual imputation.

The Svatantrika school, however, asserts that nothing exists inherently from the side of the external object without being established by a Unimpaired Mind.

Such inherent existence is referred to as “true existence”; clinging to this true existence despite its absence is called “grasping at true existence.”

If one fully realizes that nothing exists inherently from the side of the object beyond mere conceptual imputation, one has realized the absence of true existence, which is the realization of emptiness.

The Principle of Dependent Imputation and the Refutation of Inherent Existence

“A Commentary on the Hidden and Profound Intent of the Introduction to the Middle Way” states:

“If one understands the principle of dependent imputation of phenomena, one can quickly and easily comprehend the grasping at the opposite — true existence.”

This means that understanding the principle of dependent imputation allows one to grasp how clinging to true existence arises.

Regarding the object of negation — “inherent existence” — if it is not initially apprehended by the mind as an object, then the refutation of this inherent existence (the “non-affirming negation”) cannot arise in the mind.

Recognizing the definitive object of negation is extremely important.

To establish the absence of inherent existence, it is not sufficient to merely negate non-existent or inherently non-existent aggregates in conventional terms; rather, one must negate the object of negation upon those aggregates.

If one fails to recognize the object of negation, there is a great danger of falling into the extremes of nihilism or eternalism.

Therefore, it is essential to recognize the object of negation. How should one go about recognizing it? “If one understands the principle of dependent imputation of phenomena, one can quickly and easily comprehend the grasping at the opposite — true existence.”

In other words, understanding the principle of dependent imputation allows one to see that true existence is a deluded mind and that its imputation onto objects is mistaken. From this, one can definitively establish the reasoning for negating true existence.

Thus, recognizing “mere conceptual imputation” is of utmost importance.

The Svatantrika school asserts “mere establishment by Unimpaired appearance,” correct? The term “mere” negates existence from the side of the object’s unique nature.

If one accepts the term “mere,” it can refute inherent existence, but without it, such a refutation would be impossible.

The Svatantrika school accepts “mere establishment by Unimpaired appearance” but does not accept “mere conceptual imputation.” They believe that if something were established through mere conceptual imputation, it would imply that the object does not exist, because it is merely conceptually fabricated. Mere conceptual imputation alone, being only dependent on mental designation, would mean that the object does not actually exist.

For example, imaginary flowers in the sky are established through mere conceptual imputation and do not actually exist. This is because the phrase “mere conceptual imputation” contains the word “mere.”

Therefore, according to the Svatantrika school, if something were established through mere conceptual imputation, it should not exist, appearing like imaginary flowers in the sky. On the other hand, if something is established by Unimpaired appearance, it does exist.

The above explains the Svatantrika school. So, according to the Prasangika school, how do external objects exist?

All phenomena exist solely through conceptual imputation. These two views are fundamentally different.

We just discussed that if something exists solely through conceptual imputation, it should not exist.

In what way does it exist? It exists solely through conceptual imputation, existing only as a mental designation.

“Solely through conceptual imputation” means that it exists only as a mental designation and does not inherently exist externally. Phenomena are merely designated by the mind in this way.

Therefore, the difference between the Svatantrika and Prasangika schools is vast, like the difference between heaven and earth.

There is no need to say more about the Svatantrika school. The Prasangika school asserts that external objects do not exist beyond mere conceptual imputation.

How do external objects exist? They exist solely through conceptual imputation. For example, in monasteries or institutions, people are appointed to roles such as disciplinarian or abbot. When someone is appointed as a disciplinarian, we say, “He is the disciplinarian,” or “He is the abbot.”

This is merely a conceptual designation; there is nothing inherently existent about the person themselves — not even the slightest particle.

There is no such person who, from the beginning, was inherently a disciplinarian or abbot. Similarly, when someone ordains as a monk, they are not inherently a monk from the start.

Likewise, giving someone the name “Tashi” is merely a conceptual designation; it is not something they inherently possess from the beginning.

Why is he designated as “Tashi”? Is it because of his head? His hands? Or his feet? Upon investigation, one finds no inherent basis for this designation.

By the same reasoning, all phenomena exist solely through conceptual imputation; there is nothing inherently existent about them — not even the slightest particle.

The Deep Meaning of “Mere Conceptual Imputation” and the Nature of “Discrimination”

When we say “mere conceptual imputation,” what is meant by “conceptual”? In the phrase “mere conceptual imputation,” “conceptual” refers to a type of innate mind that has been strongly conditioned in the mental continuum of all sentient beings since beginningless time.

This innate mind falsely perceives phenomena as inherently existent rather than as dependently imputed by the mind onto their basis of imputation. Such innate conceptual thought arises vividly and clearly.

How does this innate mind operate? Generally, masters like Bhaviveka, Chandrakirti, and Shantideva have used different analogies to explain this, but the most common one is the “rope-snake analogy.”

For example, when someone mistakenly perceives a rope as a snake, they conceptually impute the idea of a snake onto the rope based on certain conditions.

However, even though the perception of a snake arises, there is nothing about the rope itself — its color, shape, parts, or totality — that can justify the belief that it is a snake.

So how does this illusion arise? It arises due to the convergence of various causes and conditions: perhaps a shadow falls on the rope, making it appear dark; its coiled shape resembles a snake; and the person knows that snakes exist.

Thus, when seeing the rope, the three conditions (object condition, dominant condition, and immediate condition) come together, giving rise to the mistaken perception of a snake. The person then exclaims, “There’s a snake!” and experiences an illusion, shouting loudly and causing others nearby to also imagine snakes.

Initially, the person merely imputes the idea of a snake through conceptual thought, thinking, “There’s a snake!” But because they fail to realize that this is merely a conceptual imputation, the illusion arises, and they shout, “What?” Similarly, we all perceive various phenomena through conceptual thought. However, from the side of the object itself, there is no inherent existence of “this or that.”

When we mistakenly perceive a rope as a snake, whether we examine its color, shape, parts, or totality, there is nothing in the rope that justifies the belief, “This is a snake!” Instead, it is our own mind that imputes the idea of a snake onto the rope.

By analogy, for any phenomenon — whether it be a “self,” a “person,” or any other entity — we immediately generate the thought “this or that” based on the aggregation of its basis of imputation. Yet, upon analysis, there is nothing in the object’s color, shape, parts, or totality that justifies such an imputation. Nor is there any reason to impute other unrelated phenomena onto it. Everything exists solely through conceptual imputation onto its basis.

The “self” or “me” that we hold so precious also exists only through imputation on the aggregates. “Imputation on the aggregates” means that the mind conceptually designates “I” onto the aggregates, giving rise to false discrimination. How does this discrimination impute “I” onto the aggregates? As previously explained, it is the innate mind, conditioned since beginningless time, that generates the thought of “I.”

How does this thought arise? Initially, the aggregates — either collectively or individually — appear as the object of the mind. Then, based on recognition of these bases of imputation, the thought of “I” arises. However, this does not mean that the thought “this is me” would arise for aggregates that have not appeared to the mind, whether collectively or individually. Therefore, how the discriminating mind apprehends depends on the aggregates appearing as the object of the mind.

When the aggregates — the bases of imputation — appear to the mind, the thought “I” arises naturally. Questions such as “Is the self identical to or different from the five aggregates?” do not arise in the mind; instead, the thought “this is me” arises effortlessly. The mind that imputes “I” onto the aggregates operates through this process of conceptual designation.

It is crucial to thoroughly understand this and deeply realize that the “self” exists only through conceptual imputation. If one fails to understand this and merely relies on verbal conventions to contemplate its meaning, attempting to establish certainty or realization without experiential understanding, no genuine certainty will arise in the mind.

The Difference Between Types of Imputation and the Relationship Between Basis of Imputation and Imputed Phenomena

The false imputation involved in mistakenly perceiving a rope as a snake or the mistaken belief that sound is permanent — these are examples of distorted imputations. These differ from the process of imputing various phenomena onto their basis of imputation, although both involve imputation.

To illustrate the latter: When the basis of imputation — the aggregates — arises in one’s mind, if one subsequently conceives of an “I,” this does not mean thinking, “These are my five aggregates,” nor does it involve superimposing the notion of “I” onto the aggregates.

At this point, the imputed phenomenon — the “I” — arises in the mind and projects itself onto the basis of imputation (the aggregates), becoming the object of mental apprehension.

The basis of imputation thus clearly appears in the mind as the imputed phenomenon. These are what we refer to as the “basis of imputation” and the “imputed phenomenon.”

As previously explained, the “basis of imputation” and the “imputed phenomenon” are inseparable. However, due to our strong attachment to inherent existence, we must investigate the meaning of imputation and use reasoning to locate it.

If we cannot find it, we cannot establish it, and our minds will continue to wander. The phrase “imputing the imputed phenomenon onto the basis of imputation” does not imply that the imputed phenomenon is identical to the basis of imputation. For example, the “I” is imputed onto the aggregates such as form, but these two are by no means the same.

Therefore, to thoroughly understand “mere conceptual imputation,” you must contemplate deeply.

Through this contemplation, you can develop certainty that clinging to true existence is mistaken. With this certainty, you will hopefully come to realize emptiness.

Concluding Remarks

Even though you may not fully understand, you have already established some familiarity. Having established this familiarity, repeated contemplation will surely lead to progress and guide you toward emptiness.

To attain the ultimate bliss of the omniscient state of full enlightenment, we need both skillful means and wisdom. It is crucial to practice bodhicitta diligently, as it serves as the foundation for both. Simultaneously, as its companion, we must also cultivate the wisdom of emptiness.

If you can diligently practice both skillful means and wisdom, you will fully possess the causes for attaining enlightenment — namely, skillful means and wisdom. Therefore, with the aim of achieving this goal, I have shared these teachings with you today, which also reflect my aspirations for all of you.

We have Geshe Tenzin Dorjee; in the future, it would be wonderful if he could teach you more about emptiness. Ani also frequently gives teachings, so everyone should strive diligently.

This is excellent, and I rejoice in your efforts. On a daily basis, you must resolve to work hard and practice with great determination. This is very important.

Tomorrow at 1 PM, we will grant the permission initiation of Kurukulla. It is not easy for all of you to value emptiness and attend these teachings, and I rejoice in your efforts. Even if you do not yet understand, merely generating a reasonable doubt can, as stated in The Four Hundred Verses : “Also destroy the three realms of existence.” Thus, this is very important.

Up until now, we have been wandering in the cycle of birth and death within the three realms. Even causing a slight crack in this cycle is beneficial. Therefore, let us each make aspirations — even just making aspirations is very good.

The above is a translation from our Chinese webpage, based on original Tibetan teachings.